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INTRODUCTION
Modern doctrine and scholarship largely take it for granted that
offenders should be criminally punished for reckless acts.1 Yet,
developments in our understanding of human behavior can shed light
on how we define and attribute criminal liability, or at least force us to
grapple with the categories that have existed for so long.
This Article examines recklessness and related doctrines in light of
the shifts in understanding of adolescent behavior and its biological
roots, to see what insights we might attain, or what challenges these
understandings pose to this foundational mens rea doctrine. Over the
past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that youth are
categorically different for purposes of criminal sentencing, and that
these categorical differences in maturity, ability to make reasoned
decisions, resist outside pressure and influences and the like lead to
objective lines being drawn between youth and adults. The Court's
distinctions have drawn on a significant body of research literature,
including brain imaging scans that help us understand the maturation
of the human brain over the course of adolescence.
This Article posits that these developments, when mapped onto
existing criminal law, call into question holding youth responsible for
offenses that require actual foresight of the consequences of their risky
behavior. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent analyses of the
categorical differences between youth and adults in the criminal
realm,2 as well as the science and social science research underlying
I See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L.
REv. 111, 113 (2008) (stating that recklessness is "one of the oldest concepts in
Anglo-American tort law," first applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in "common
carrier and admiralty cases in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s" and "became an important
legal concept in twentieth century American codification efforts, namely the Model
Penal Code"). See generally Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in
Criminal Liability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 822-30 (1980) (attempting to determine
when the criminal law recognized the various modern mentes reae, noting the
difficulty of pinpointing when a mens rea was generally accepted). Robinson notes "at
least a partial recognition of a careless-faultless distinction by the ninth or tenth
century." Id. at 834. Robinson further documents the rise of the distinction between
recklessness and negligence in the late 18th century, when reformers would have used
the distinction as the demarcation between criminal liability and non-liability. Id. at
841. Robinson additionally states that the distinction, for purposes of substantive
liability instead of mitigation, between recklessness and negligence was not firmly
entrenched until the Model Penal Code in 1962. Id. at 847.
2 Elizabeth S. Scott, "Children Are Different": Constitutional Values and Justice
Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 72 (2013) ("With increasing clarity, the Court has
announced a broad principle grounded in developmental knowledge that 'children are
different' from adult offenders and that these differences are important to the law's
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these differences, wears away - for this category of individuals - the
basis for holding youth in juvenile or adult court accountable for
crimes of "foresight" and express disregard for risk.
In Part 1, the Article describes the Court's significant cases
addressing the line between children and adults under the Eighth
Amendment and Miranda. Discussion of these decisions has largely
been limited, with a few exceptions, to implications for sentencing law
and the law of confessions. This Article draws connections between
these cases, and, more importantly, considers the theoretical and
doctrinal implications of these cases beyond the confines of their
immediate setting.3
Part 11 reviews some of the research literature on youth decision-
making, with a focus on the studies on risk-taking. It takes a particular
interdisciplinary look at the literature of the impact of peers on youth
decision-making and the impact of stress or lack of time for reflection
on youth decision-making.
Part III addresses the areas in criminal law for which the juvenile
cases and research have, I argue, significant implications: places where
there is criminal liability based on foreseen consequences. Part III
addresses the role of recklessness in criminal law, as well as the
"natural and probable consequences" doctrine - the other major area
of substantive criminal law where accountability is based on what the
offender is supposed to have actually foreseen.
In Parts IV and V, I consider what this youth foresight doctrine
would look like, consider some drawbacks, and provide a few possible
tools for its implementation. Part IV also connects back to other
theoretical and doctrinal implications of adopting a youth foresight
approach. The Article demarcates reckless offenses from negligent
offenses - asserting that we can still embrace the reasonable person
(i.e., reasonable adult) with respect to negligence. Shifting our
recklessness inquiry, and maintaining the negligence standard for
youth is also consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to
youth crime, which looks not to excuse or justify juvenile behavior,
but to adjust culpability to more closely align with expected behavior.
response to youthful criminal conduct.").
3 For others considering these implications, see Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science
and the Theory ofjuvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539, 590 (2016) (inquiring about
the impact of adolescent brain science on mens rea generally); Christopher Northrop
& Kristina Rothley Rozan, Kids Will Be Kids: Time for a "Reasonable Child" Standard
for the Proof of Objective Mens Rea Elements, 69 ME. L. REV. 109, 134 (2017)
(suggesting that in juvenile court a "reasonable youth" standard should be adopted).
1668 [Vol. 52:1665
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1. LAW ADDRESSING YOUTH AND THEIR APPRECIATION OF FUTURE
CONSEQUENCES
In this Part, I look at the underlying U.S. Supreme Court law
focusing on the ability of youth to appreciate the consequences of
their actions and estimate future risk. I describe the recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases in which the Court has distinguished juvenile
offenders from adult offenders based on the unique characteristics of
adolescence. This law forms the backdrop for the understanding that,
while youth may be held culpable for their failure to appreciate risks
and consequences that a reasonable adult would have foreseen, youth
should not be held accountable for actual knowledge of risk and
future consequences.
The Court first relied on these scientific developments and
improved understanding of adolescent development in Roper v.
Simmons.4 Specifically, the Court described three important differences
between youth and adults that "demonstrate that juvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders."5 First,
the Court highlighted that:
[Als any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological
studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, "[a] lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions." It has
been noted that adolescents are overrepresented statistically in
virtually every category of reckless behavior.
Second, the Court noted that youth are more vulnerable than adults
to outside influences, including peer pressure. 6 The Court attributed
this, in part, to youths' inability to control or manage their home and
neighborhood environment.7 "The third broad difference is that the
4 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
5 Id. at 569 (citations omitted) (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)).
6 Id.
7 Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) (" [Als legal minors,
[juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a
criminogenic setting.")).
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character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed."8
In distilling these three important distinctions, the Roper Court cited
to current and earlier research on adolescent development, 9 and in
reaching its decision the Court received amicus briefs related to youth
development. 10 This research focused on adolescents generally or,
sometimes, older teens because the question in Roper was the death
penalty for sixteen and seventeen year olds.11
With these three distinctions in mind, the Roper Court examined
whether the purposes of punishment were met for youth by the death
penalty. Specific to the discussion in this Article, the Court found that
the goal of deterrence was not met, as the "same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles
will be less susceptible to deterrence." 12 In particular, as the plurality
observed in Thompson, "[t] he likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the
possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent." 13
Much of the Court's understanding of the research underlying this
conclusion came from an amicus brief submitted by the American
Psychological Association, which argued that "behavioral studies and
recent neuropsychological research" show that execution of minors
would not satisfy Eighth Amendment standards or meet the goals of
punishment.14
The Court extended this understanding of juvenile culpability to the
context of life without parole sentences in Graham v. Florida,15 Miller
v. Alabama,16 and Montgomery v. Louisiana.17 In Graham, in which the
8 Id. at 570.
9 See, e.g., id. at 569 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992); Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity,
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009,
1014 (2003)).
10 See Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, & the Missouri Psychological
Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1636447.
11 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380
(1989) (allowing death penalty for a seventeen year old); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
387 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (barring death penalty for a fifteen year old).
12 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
13 Id. at 572 (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837).
14 Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, & the Missouri Psychological Ass'n
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 10, at 4.
15 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
16 567 U.S. 460 (2012)
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Court found life without parole unconstitutional for juveniles for a
nonhomicide offense, the Court carried forward the Roper analysis and
similarly emphasized the diminished culpability of youth. The Court
required that these offenders have a "meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." 18 In
Miller, in finding the mandatory imposition of life without parole
unconstitutional for youth, the Court reemphasized the biological and
legal differences between youth and adults.'9 The Miller Court
concluded that Graham and Roper "establish that children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing" and
that laws that fail to take into account this difference are "flawed." 20
The Court reiterated one of the core differences between youth and
adults was the "failure to appreciate risks and consequences,"21 and
stated that the occasions are "rare" where a life without parole
sentence is appropriate for an individual who was under eighteen at
the time of their offense.2 2 The Miller Court further required that any
youth subject to a sentence of life without parole must have an
individualized sentencing hearing at which "youth and [its] attendant
circumstances" are considered. 23 Montgomery held that Miller involved
a substantive constitutional right and that life without parole was
constitutionally prohibited for all but the rarest juvenile offenders. 24
While Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery all address the
intersection of youth and extreme punishment, the Court has also
carried over its understanding of youth's differing perceptions and
experiences into other areas of the criminal law, most notably inJ.D.B.
v. North Carolina.25 In J.D.B., the Court held that that, for purposes of
17 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
18 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
19 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
20 Id. at 471, 473-74 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 76).
21 Id. at 477 (stating that mandatory life without parole improperly "precludes
consideration of [the defendant's] chronological age and its hallmark features ...
[including] immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences").
22 Id. at 479.
23 Id. at 483.
24 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016). In Montgomery, the
Court emphasized that the Miller decision drew an Eighth Amendment line between
the "rare" youth whose crime reflects "irreparable corruption" and who could
constitutionally be considered for a life without parole sentence, and the vast majority
of youthful defendants whose crime reflected "transient immaturity" and who are not
eligible for a life without parole sentence. Id. at 734.
25 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011); see also Emily C. Keller,
Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper,
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the Miranda inquiry into custody, that the factfinder may take the age
of the offender into account, as long as the youth of the individual was
known or would have been apparent to a reasonable officer.26
The Court based its ruling on the fact that "children as a class" 27 are
less mature, vulnerable to peer and other pressures, and "lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them."28 And, in highlighting these
distinctions between children and adults, cited to Roper and Graham,
as well as earlier decisions involving youth.29 The Court also made
reference to tort law treatment of a "reasonable person" when a child
was involved and concluded that " [iindeed, even where a 'reasonable
person' standard otherwise applies, the common law has reflected the
reality that children are not adults." 30 The Court posited that a
contrary ruling would create an "absurdity" of conducting the analysis
of the facts of this case - being taken from seventh-grade social
studies class and told by the assistant principal to "do the right thing"
- from the position of a reasonable adult of average age.31
In J.D.B., the government argued against taking age into account, in
part, because of the fluid and flexible nature of custodial interrogation,
including that law enforcement officers were making on the spot
determinations.32 Prior law, cited again by the Court, had relied on the
nature of the police decision-making to constrain the analysis to an
objective one.33 The Court took pains to emphasize that it was not
moving towards a subjectivization of the custody determination34 and
Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 298 (2012) (contending that juveniles
convicted of a felony offense cannot constitutionally be sentenced to juvenile life
without parole); Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme Court
Heralds the Emergence of the 'Reasonable Juvenile' in American Criminal Law, 89 CRIM.
L. REP. 753, 753 (2011) (discussing how the decisions handed down in J.D.B.,
Graham, and Roper made a pathway for changing the "reasonable person" standard to
a "reasonable child" standard).
26 J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277.
27 Id. at 271-72.
28 Id. at 272 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality
opinion)).
29 Id. at 271-72.
30 Id. at 274 (citing as an example RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2005)).
31 Id. at 275-76.
32 Id. at 279-80 (citing Brief for Respondent at 20, J.D.B., 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (No.
09-11121)) (rebutting government move for "clarity" with an objective standard that
does not take age into consideration).
33 Id. at 270-71.
34 See, e.g., id. at 271 (reiterating that, under prior law, the "test ... involves no
1672 [Vol. 52:1665
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that age differs from other personal, and idiosyncratic,
characteristics.35 Instead, "childhood yields objective conclusions." 36
II. YOUTH AND RISK-TAKING
Youth take more risks than adults.3 7 As the U.S. Supreme Court
noted, every parent knows that teenagers are prone to risk taking and
poor decision-making, which can result in criminal conduct.3 8
What underlies this phenomenon? This Part examines some of the
research literature on youth and risk taking generally, and also
highlights two relevant areas of the research on youth decision-
making: the effect of peer influence and the impact of stress or
pressure on the decision-making of adolescents. The scientific
consideration of the 'actual mindset' of the particular suspect subjected to police
questioning"); id. at 277 (stating that age's "inclusion in the custody analysis is
consistent with the objective nature of that test"). But see Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja
Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
2161, 2218 (2016) (discussing J.D.B. and stating that "the decision arguably opened
the door to subjective considerations under the reasonable person inquiry").
35 J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274-75.
36 Id. at 275.
37 See Bernd Figner et al., Affective and Deliberative Processes in Risky Choice: Age
Differences in Risk Taking in the Columbia Card Task, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 709, 709-30 (2009) (describing the "typical
developmental trajectory" of risky behavior, which "peaks [during] adolescence and
early adulthood and decreases again during adulthood," and stating that the pattern
has been identified in a range of risk-taking behaviors, including "traffic, unsafe sexual
practices, delinquent behaviors, and risky recreational sports" (citations omitted)); see
also, e.g., Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective,
12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339-40 (1992); Stephanie Burnett et al., Adolescents'
Heightened Risk-Seeking in a Probabilistic Gambling Task, 25 COGNITIVE DEv. 183, 185
(2010) (showing the results of a study on risky and safe choices in a computer
gambling game, where teenagers, especially fourteen year olds, were shown to have
taken more risks than other younger and older groups studied).
38 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) ("First, as any parent knows
and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to
confirm, '[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found
in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions."'
(quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 US. 350, 367 (1993))). See generally Terry A.
Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
765, 767 (2011) ("Over the last decade, developmental neuroscience has generated a
scientific consensus that, when considered in the aggregate, teen brains are
structurally and functionally different from those of both children and adults. As those
differences are nonnegligible and as they appear to map onto teens' social and
decisional immaturity, juvenile advocates and defenders quickly began to incorporate
neuroscientific claims into ones grounded in developmental psychology.").
2019]1 1673
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literature, which stems increasingly from neuroimaging studies, has
begun to examine a few important points relevant to our
understanding of youth culpability, risk-assessment and criminality.39
First, the prefrontal cortex, which is an important center of
"executive functions" in the brain - related to such things as impulse
control - develops fully in later adolescence. Studies using MRI
scanning have helped researchers begin to understand further the
functioning and development of the human brain. 40 These studies, as
well as injury and animal studies,4 ' have given insight into areas of the
brain that have greater roles in certain functions.42 The prefrontal
cortex has been identified as the center of "executive function" in the
39 Legal scholars in a number of areas have been analyzing the effect on doctrine
of current neuroscience understanding. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD,
and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 91-94 (2012) (considering use of
neuroscience in sentencing defendants diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD)); Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, Wha Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About
Criminal Responsibility?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 120, 137 (2015) ("Important
neuroscientific work on self-control has emerged in recent years, although it remains
uncertain how, if at all, it bears on criminal responsibility."). And, there is a rich
debate in the legal scholarship on the extent and scope of our reliance on the current
state of neuroscience knowledge and how much we should adjust legal doctrine in
response. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006) (critiquing the use
of neuroscience to draw conclusions about criminal responsibility); Francis X. Shen,
Neurolegislation: How U.S. Legislators Are Using Brain Science, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
495 (2016). See generally OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAw
AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014) (casebook examining application of neuroscience in law
and the courtroom). Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence:
Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62 MERCER L. REV. 861 (2011).
40 See generally Scanning the Brain, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL AsS'N (Aug. 2014),
http://www.apa.org/action/resources/research-in-action/scan.aspx; Carolyn Asbury,
Brain Imaging Technologies and Their Applications in Neuroscience, DANA FOUND. (Nov.
2011), https://dana.org/uploadedFiles/Pdfs/brainimagingtechnologies.pdf.
41 See, e.g., John Martyn Harlow, Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar Through
the Head, in 2 PUBLICATIONS MASS. MED. Soc'Y 3 (1868).
42 To be sure, there is no one "place" in the brain where a function happens
entirely. Instead, scientists believe, based on current research, that there are
interrelated systems. The current understanding, however, is that some regions of the
brain are more involved with some functions and not others. See Nancy Kanwisher,
Functional Specificity in the Human Brain: A Window into the Functional Architecture of
the Mind, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 11163, 11164 (2010). For example, the occipital
lobe is known for its significant involvement with vision, yet the frontal, temporal,
parietal lobes have functions dedicated to vision as well as "nearly the entire caudal
half of the cerebral cortex is dedicated to processing visual information." Valentin
Dragoi, Chapter 15: Visual Processing: Cortical Pathways, UNIv. TEx. HEALTH:
NEUROSCIENCE ONLINE, https://nba.uth.tmc.edulneuroscience/rn/s2/chapter15.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
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brain, involved with complex planning, prediction of future outcomes
and planning, and control of emotion. 43 These functions are distinct
from what might colloquially be thought of as raw intellect - the
ability to do complex math or read hard books.44
Scanning studies have shown that the prefrontal cortex is one of the
last brain regions to mature - with full maturation in typical
individuals in the early twenties.45 The U.S. Supreme Court cited to
43 See Hyun Jin Chung, Lisa L. Weyandt & Anthony Swentosky, The Physiology of
Executive Functioning, in HANDBOOK OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 13 (Sam Goldstein and
Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2014) ("Over the years, major features of executive functions
have been identified, and these include abilities such as inhibitory control, attention
shifting, working memory, goal-directed behavior, and strategic planning." (citations
omitted)).
44 See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Supama Choudhury, Development of the
Adolescent Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 296, 301 (2006) ("The term executive function is used to
describe the capacity that allows us to control and coordinate our thoughts and
behaviour. These skills include selective attention, decision-making, voluntary
response inhibition and working memory. Each of these executive functions has a role
in cognitive control, for example filtering out unimportant information, holding in
mind a plan to carry out in the future and inhibiting impulses." (citation omitted)); cf.
S.A. Bunge & M.J. Souza, Executive Function and Higher-Order Cognition:
Neuroimaging, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEUROSCIENCE 111 (2009) ("The terms executive
function and cognitive control refer to cognitive processes associated with the control
of thought and action. Putative control functions include the ability to (1) selectively
attend to relevant information while filtering out distracting information (selective
attention and interference suppression), (2) work with information that is currently
being held in working memory (manipulation), (3) flexibly switch between tasks (task
switching), (4) inhibit inappropriate response tendencies (response inhibition), and
(5) represent contextual information that determines whether a thought is relevant or
whether an action is appropriate. (e.g., task-set representation)."); Rebecca Elliott,
Executive Functions and their Disorders, 65 BRIT. MED. BULL. 49, 50 (2003) ("This
flexible co-ordination of sub-processes to achieve a specific goal is the responsibility of
executive control systems. When these systems break down, behaviour becomes
poorly controlled, disjointed and disinhibited. Co-ordination, control and goal-
orientation are, therefore, at the heart of the concept of executive function.").
It was previously hypothesized, and now largely rejected, that youth did not have
the cognitive capacity to make reasoned, deliberate decisions. See Figner et al., supra
note 37, at 710 (describing previous cognitive development explanations for youth
risk taking).
45 See Sara B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and
the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy,
45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 218 (2009) ("Evidence suggests that, in the prefrontal
cortex, this does not occur until the early 20s or later."); see also CAROL LYNN MARTIN
& RICHARD FABES, DISCOVERING CHILD DEVELOPMENT 247 (2d ed. 2009) ("The
continuing [structural] development of the prefrontal cortex throughout childhood
and into adolescence means that this part of the brain has the most prolonged period
of development of all the regions of the brain. . . . Given that the functions associated
2019]1 1675
University of California, Davis
these neuroscience findings about maturation when it had the juvenile
sentencing cases before it.46
The second, related, conclusion from the developmental literature is
that young people have an increased propensity to seek out and
engage in risky behavior; they are exceptionally "reward seeking."47
Relatedly, youth in search of these immediate rewards are less likely
than adults to delay gratification for future benefit.48
The resulting "developmental mismatch" between youth's risk-
seeking behavior and the immature functioning of impulse control and
other restraints helps us understand what we observe of teen
behavior.49 This "mismatch" between the development of reward
seeking and impulse control systems "has been proposed to underlie
stereotypical adolescent behaviors such as risk taking, sensation
seeking and heightened emotional reactivity."50 A developmental
with the prefrontal cortex are continuing to develop over childhood, and that this part
of the brain is the last to develop, it should not be surprising that children have yet to
reach adult-like levels of planning, behaving appropriately, and remembering.").
46 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (citing neuroscience literature);
see also Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, & the Missouri Psychological
Ass'n as Anici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11-12, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-
633), 2004 WL 1636447.
4 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too
Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 107, 115-17 (2013).
48 See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Trevor W. Robbins, Decision-making in the
Adolescent Brain, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1184, 1184 (2012); see also Bonnie L.
Halpem-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-
making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
257, 271 (2001) (noting that "these changes have a profound effect on their ability to
make consistently mature decisions").
For articles addressing levels of planning and thinking about the future as youth
grow older, see Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity andjudgment
in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
741, 756-57 (2000) (reporting that adolescents, on average, were "less responsible,
more myopic, and less temperate than the average adult"); Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do
Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and
Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 29 (1991). Cauffman & Steinberg examined a
study of more than 1,000 adolescents and adults to investigate the relationships
among the factors of age, maturity, and antisocial decision-making. Cauffman &
Steinberg, supra note 48, at 756. The biggest changes in behavior occurred between
sixteen and nineteen years old, especially in the ability to limit impulsivity and
evaluate situations before acting and the taking of different viewpoints and
perspectives. See id.
49 Daniel P. Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 45, 46-48 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds.,
2004).
50 Katherine L. Mills et al., The Developmental Mismatch in Structural Brain
Maturation During Adolescence, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 147, 149 (2014)
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mismatch is not something specific to delinquent or wayward teens;
instead, it is present in "ordinary" teens - what the literature calls
neurotypical individuals.51
The upside of thinking about adolescent development through this
mismatch lens is that we can see that as youth develop into adulthood,
this mismatch diminishes. 52 With respect to criminal behavior, this
observation is consistent with the literature suggesting that most
youth age out of criminal behavior.53
One additional piece of the puzzle is that the adolescent
development literature finds that disruptions or obstacles to decision-
making, such as stress - features often found in a criminal setting -
make it less likely youth will make a "better" or "mature" choice.54 In
other words, another important piece of the research literature
suggests that youth, even those who are developmentally "able" to
make (what an adult would see as) a good choice, can more easily be
thrown off by disruptions or obstacles to decision-making. When
faced with situations of heightened arousal, youth make riskier
choices than adults, even when the youth seem to have the cognitive
capacity to "think like an adult."55
(offering a table of studies using functional neuroimaging that use a developmental
mismatch model).
51 See id. at 148. (reporting results of a study that attempted to look at whether the
mismatch occurred in individual people and, with a small sample size, the majority of
the individuals showed early maturation of areas of the brain associated with sensation
seeking and later maturation of the prefrontal cortex). For additional discussion of
developmental mismatch, see also Linda Van Leijenhorst et al., Adolescent Risky
Decision-Making: Neurocognitive Development of Reward and Control Regions, 51
NEUROIMAGE 345, 345-55 (2010).
52 Mills et al., supra note 50, at 148 fig.1.
53 See Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial
Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993) ("When
official rates of crime are plotted against age, the rates for both prevalence and
incidence of offending appear highest during adolescence; they peak sharply at about
age 17 and drop precipitously in young adulthood.").
54 Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: The Role of Brain
Science in Protecting Adolescents, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 455-60 (2014) ("With
respect to emotional regulation, stress can affect adolescents' 'ability to effectively
regulate behavior as well as . .. to weigh costs and benefits and override impulses with
rational thought."').
55 Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 56 (2009) [hereinafter Adolescent Development] ("Even when
adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision making
may still differ from that of adults due to psychosocial immaturity. Indeed, research
indicates that psychosocial maturation proceeds more slowly than cognitive
development, and that age differences in judgment may reflect social and emotional
differences between adolescents and adults that continue well beyond mid-
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In their decisions about risk taking, youth are susceptible to socio-
emotional influences and the influence of peers. 56 The literature
suggests that youth are more susceptible than adults to the influence
of peers.57 Youth can, and do, make "good" decisions, and, as
indicated above, are more likely to do so when they are not around
peers and when the decision is made under circumstances that allow
calm deliberation and reflection.
Finally, a related point: it may take more "work" for youth to make
reasoned decisions than adults.58 Studies have shown that it takes
adolescence. Of particular relevance to the present discussion are age differences in
susceptibility to peer influence, future orientation, reward sensitivity, and the capacity
for self-regulation. Available research indicates that adolescents and adults differ
significantly with respect to each of these attributes."); David A. Sturman & Bita
Moghaddam, The Neurobiology of Adolescence: Changes in Brain Architecture,
Functional Dynamics, and Behavioral Tendencies, 35 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL
REvs. 1704, 1706 (2011) (stating that "Iclollectively, these studies indicate that
although adolescents often reason and behave like adults, in certain contexts there are
differences in their cognitive strategy and/or in their response to risk and reward,
especially under conditions of heightened emotional arousal").
56 See Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing
Activity in the Brain's Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL Sci. Fl, Fl-F2 (2011)
("[A]dolescents' relatively greater propensity toward risky behavior reflects the joint
contribution of two brain systems that affect decision-making: (i) an incentive
processing system ... which biases decision-making based on the valuation and
prediction of potential rewards and punishments; and (ii) a cognitive control system,
including the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), which supports goal-directed
decisionmaking by keeping impulses in check and by providing the mental machinery
needed for deliberation regarding alternative choices.... We propose that adolescents'
especially heightened propensity to take risks when with peers may derive from the
maturational imbalance between these competing brain systems.").
57 See, e.g., Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking,
Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An
Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005) (concluding from a
survey using questionnaires and a task that "peer effects on risk taking and risky
decision making were stronger among adolescents and youths than adults"); Laurence
Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1531 (2007) ("[Tjhere is little doubt that peers
actually influence each other and that the effects of peer influence are stronger during
adolescence than in adulthood. Indeed, one recent experimental study found that
exposure to peers during a risk-taking task doubled the amount of risky behavior
among middle adolescents, increased it by 50% among college undergraduates, and
had no impact at all among adults."); see also, e.g., Bruce G. Simons-Morton et al., The
Effect of Passengers and Risk-Taking Friends on Risky Driving and Crashes/Near Crashes
Among Novice Teenagers, 49 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 587, 588 (2011).
58 See Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra note 55, at 56 ("The notion that
adolescents and adults demonstrate comparable capacities for understanding and
reasoning should not be taken to mean that they also demonstrate comparable levels
of maturity of judgment, however. ... Indeed, research indicates that psychosocial
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enormous focus and energy for youth to exercise executive
functioning. Even when youths' external decisions appear to be the
same as those of an adult, scanning studies suggest that the youth are
processing differently than adults.59 The understanding is that, over
time, the neural pathways needed to make these types of decisions are
created and honed; allowing typical adults to make decisions that are
taxing for typical teenagers. 60
maturation proceeds more slowly than cognitive development, and that age
differences in judgment may reflect social and emotional differences between
adolescents and adults that continue well beyond mid-adolescence."). See generally
Blakemore & Robbins, supra note 48, at 1184-91 (discussing discrepancies between
decision-making functions in adults and adolescents by analyzing various research
studies, experiments, and scientific data on the brain, and finding that the
discrepancies stem from factors such as the development of certain brain regions or
lack thereof, sensitivity to neural activity in the brain's reward-processing regions, and
the ability to resist external stimuli and manage impulses).
5 LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEw SCIENCE OF
ADOLESCENCE 76-77 (2014) [hereinafter AGE OF OPPORTUNITY]; see also NAT'L INST. OF
MENTAL HEALTH, THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION 2 (2011),
https://infocenter.nimh.nih.gov/pubstatic/NIH%2011-4929/NIH%2011-4929.pdf ("One
of the features of the brain's growth in early life is that there is an early blooming of
synapses - the connections between brain cells or neurons - followed by pruning as
the brain matures. Synapses are the relays over which neurons communicate with each
other and are the basis of the working circuitry of the brain. . . . Scientists believe that
the loss of synapses as a child matures is part of the process by which the brain
becomes more efficient.").
60 See STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 59, at 77 ("On very challenging
tasks of self-control, adults, like children, often show more widespread activation than
that seen in adolescents, but unlike the diffuse and scattershot pattern seen among
children, the activity in different parts of the adult brain is highly coordinated - like
the movements of experiences soccer players rather than the disorganized play of kids
who know the basic rules but haven't yet figured out the intricacies of team play."); cf.
Sarah Durston & BJ. Casey, What Have We Learned About Cognitive Development from
Neuroimaging?, 44 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2149, 2151 (2005) ("In some studies,
developmental changes in patterns of brain activation could be conceptualized as a shift
in patterns of activation from diffuse to more focal, where diffuse refers to larger or
more areas of activation, and focal indicates smaller areas of activation, with greater
magnitude of signal change. These changes may represent a fine-tuning of relevant
neural systems or related developmental changes, such as new brain regions coming
online and reduced involvement of others, and may be related to shifts in cognitive
strategy, in some studies." (citations omitted)); Teen Brain: Behavior, Problem Solving,
and Decision Making, AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Sept. 2016),
http://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families andYouth/Facts_forFamilies/FFF-Guide/The-
Teen-Brain-Behavior-Problem-Solving-and-Decision-Making-095.aspx ("Other changes
in the brain during adolescence include a rapid increase in the connections between the
brain cells and making the brain pathways more effective. . . . Pictures of the brain in
action show that adolescents' brains work differently than adults when they make
decisions or solve problems. Their actions are guided more by the emotional and
reactive amygdala and less by the thoughtful, logical frontal cortex.").
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III. FORESIGHT IN CRIMINAL LAW: RECKLESSNESS AND NATURAL AND
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
This Part focuses in on two areas of the criminal law that should
cause particular inspection when considering what effect, if any,
modern adolescent development understanding and the law that has
followed should have on criminal law more broadly. These doctrines
- the mens rea of recklessness and the "natural and probable
consequences" doctrine - both anticipate that individuals foresee the
possible consequences of their risky or illegal actions. And, unlike
negligence, where we as a society have made a decision to hold
individuals accountable for consequences that they did not anticipate,
recklessness and natural and probable consequences purport to hold
individuals for the acts and consequences that they did anticipate. For
this reason, as discussed in Part IV, these doctrines are particularly
undermined by evidence that an entire class of defendants does not
evaluate risk and anticipate consequences in the way that our law
presumes.
A. The Thin Line Between Recklessness and Negligence in Criminal Law
and the Prevalence of Reckless Mens Rea Offenses
In criminal law, a reckless mens rea is one where the individual
knows of a significant risk, and chooses to proceed anyway, where a
reasonable or law-abiding person would not. For example, the Model
Penal Code ("MPC") states that "[a] person acts recklessly . . . when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk," and
that this risk is such that "its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation." 61 The MPC posits that there should be
consideration of "the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and
the circumstances known to him," when evaluating this risk.62 Similar
definitions are found in state statutes. 63
61 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (definition of
"recklessly").
62 Id.
63 See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(3) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(10)(c)
(2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(3) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 231(e) (2018);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-206(3) (2018); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-6 (2018); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5202(j) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(II)(c) (2018); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-2(b)(3) (2018); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.05(3) (2018); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.085(9) (2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(b)(3) (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
11-302(c) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(3) (2018); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-
104(a)(ix) (2018); see also COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(8) (2018) (not comparing to a
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Common examples of offenses requiring this mens rea include
manslaughter, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving.64 These
offenses, and others, are ubiquitous in criminal codes. 65 The scholarly
debate largely assumes that there should be offenses that require a
reckless mens rea and discusses the scope and extent of those crimes.
For example, one robust area of discussion is whether there should be
an offense of attempted reckless homicide.66 Another area of scholarly
discourse involves when it is desirable or appropriate to hold
corporations or individuals within a corporate group responsible for
reckless behavior.67
law-abiding person in defining "recklessly" as: "A person acts recklessly when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or
that a circumstance exists"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (2018) ("A person acts
recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain
result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to
circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to
exist.").
64 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3, 211.2. (AM. LAw INST. 1962); see also, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-222 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:99 (2018); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAw § 3-204 (2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705 (2018).
65 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (2018) (reckless endangerment); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/4-6 (2018) (recklessness); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1025 (2018) (recklessly
endangering another person); cf. 5 Michael Dore, LAw OF Toxic TORTS § 32:4 (2018)
("Many states also have statutes specifically making the reckless endangerment of the
health or welfare of other human beings a criminal violation. Once again, the language
of these statutes varies from state to state, but most provide that 'a person is guilty of
reckless endangerment . .. when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person."'); Daniel G. Moriarty,
Dumb and Dumber: Reckless Encouragement to Reckless Wrongdoers, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J.
647, 647 (2010) ("Reckless endangerment is ultimately unsuitable, however, for while
it may well be available in most states (sixty percent), it is by no means available in
all, and where it is available is generally graded as a misdemeanor only, with a
maximum imposable prison term of about a year.").
66 See Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of the Criminal
Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 879, 883-84 (2007) (describing debate).
67 See, e.g., Sarah Gibson, Polluters as Perpetrators of Person Crimes: Charging
Homicide, Assault, and Reckless Endangerment in the Face of Environmental Crime, 25 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 511 (2010) (arguing for criminal liability for the serious bodily
injury or death that results from polluters' activities); Robert Steinbuch, The Executive-
Internalization Approach to High-Risk Corporate Behavior: Establishing Individual
Criminal Liability for the Intentional or Reckless Introduction of Excessively Dangerous
Products or Services into the Stream of Commerce, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321
(2006-07) (arguing for criminal liability for risky products); see also Anne D. Samuels,
Note, Reckless Endangerment of an Employee: A Proposal in the Wake of Film Recovery
Systems to Make the Boss Responsible for His Crimes, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 873, 873
(1987) (discussing case which held a corporate employee criminally responsible for
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Negligence is usually distinguished in modern criminal law from
recklessness by the actor's lack of actual appreciation of the risk.68 For
example, the MPC finds negligence when an individual "should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk," the person "fail[s] to
perceive" the risk, and this failure to appreciate the risk is "a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation."69 Like recklessness, consideration is
taken of "the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him."70 Offenses that carry a negligence mens rea are
deemed less culpable and tend to have lesser possible punishments
than offenses that cause the same harm, but have a recklessness mens
rea. 71
murder due to the workplace conditions created for an employee who was killed on
the job); Michael Willats, Comment, Death by Reckless Design: The Need for Stricter
Criminal Statutes for Engineering-related Homicides, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 567, 569
(2009).
68 See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
431 (1998) ("The Model Penal Code includes criminal negligence among its four
'Kinds of Culpability,' but the inclusion of negligence was controversial because
negligence differs from the other three kinds of culpability in one obvious respect.
Each of the other three - purpose, knowledge, and recklessness - is defined as a
particular consciousness of harm. For example, recklessness is defined as the
conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm. In contrast, criminal negligence is
premised on a substantial risk of harm of which the actor ought to have been aware,
but was not. Because negligence, unlike the other kinds of culpability, does not
depend on a consciousness of harm, criminal negligence often is said to result in
objective liability as opposed to subjective liability.").
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAw INST. 1962) (defining "negligently").
Elsewhere, Professor Jody Armour has explored how individualizing the reasonable
person in some instances endorses defendants' racist views. See Jody D. Armour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes,
46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 785 (1994).
70 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
7' See Carroll, supra note 3, at 539, 555-57; Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall,
Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35
STAN. L. REV. 681, 695-96 (1983) (" [B]ut a defendant acting negligently is unaware of
harmful consequences and therefore is arguably neither blameworthy nor deterrable.
While most reject this view of negligent culpability, all nonetheless recognize that
negligence represents a lower level of culpability, qualitatively different from
recklessness because the negligent actor fails to recognize, rather than consciously
disregards, a risk. For this reason, recklessness is considered the norm for criminal
culpability, and negligence is punished only in the exceptional case."); see also John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in
the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1372-73 (1979) ("Legislatures apparently agree,
for American jurisdictions generally punish negligent homicide as a criminal offense.
More commonly, however, criminal liability is confined to some variety of conscious
wrongdoing. Thus, the minimum culpability most widely found in the penal law is
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The amount of subjectivity that should be incorporated into the
"reasonable person" has been a subject of vigorous debate. This is also
one area where tort law has more commonly incorporated individual
factors.72 Tort law has been more willing to explicitly consider youth
in determining culpability for negligent torts.73 The consideration of
youth in tort law, however, may be less forthcoming in situations
where it is perceived that the child is engaged in "adult" activities.74
As with recklessness, many states follow the MPC's distinction and
definition for negligence.75 Other states do not and, in some cases,
effectively define recklessness using a "should have known" standard. 76
For example, a model jury instruction in Massachusetts holds
individuals accountable for conduct it terms "reckless" when the
individual "was not conscious of the serious danger that was inherent
recklessness - a requirement of conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the actor is doing that which the law forbids. Negligence as an occasion for
penal sanctions tends to be reserved for conduct that the [sic] law-abiding citizen
would be especially anxious to avoid - e.g., causing the death of another."). Compare
ALA. CODE H§ 13A-6-2, 13A-6-3 (2018) (murder and manslaughter, respectively),
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2017) (manslaughter), and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503
(2018) (voluntary manslaughter), with ALA CODE §13A-6-4 (2018) (criminally
negligent homicide), ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.130 (2017) (criminally negligent
homicide), and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504 (2018) (involuntary manslaughter). See
generally 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302 (2018) (general requirements of culpability).
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (stating that a person negligently caused harm if they did not exercise
"reasonable care under all the circumstances").
73 Northrup & Rozan, supra note 3, at 110-11 (" [I]n cases involving children, 'the
inquiry into reasonable care . . . requires attention to considerations or circumstances
that supplement or somewhat subordinate the primary factors,' including the actor's
age, intelligence, and experience, unless the child was engaged in a dangerous activity
'characteristically undertaken by adults."' (emphasis added)).
74 Id.
75 See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(4) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(10)(d)
(2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4) (2018); HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-206(4) (2018);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-7 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(II)(d) (2018); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(4) (2018); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.05(4) (2018); OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 161.085(10) (2018); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4) (2018);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-302(d) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(4) (2018);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(a)(iii) (2018); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 231(d) (2018)
(requiring for negligence only that "the person fails to exercise the standard of care
which a reasonable person would observe in the situation").
76 FINDLAY STARK, CULPABLE CARELESSNESS: RECKLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE IN
CRIMINAL LAw 49 (2016) ("Kentucky's penal code uses the MPC's definition of
recklessness to define 'wantonness,' and the MPC's definition of negligence to define
'recklessness.' In Kentucky, then, 'recklessness' is defined in terms of risks that the
defendant should have been aware of."); see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.020 (2018)
(definition of mental states).
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in such conduct . . . if a reasonable person, under the circumstances as
they were known to the defendant, would have recognized that such
actions were so dangerous that it was very likely that they would result
in [the prohibited harm]."7
Negligence has been critiqued because, among other reasons, it can
be seen as inappropriate to hold an actor culpable for risk that was not
actually appreciated and negligent actors themselves - because they
do not appreciate the risk - cannot be deterred. 78 Negligence in
criminal law can be defended on a number of grounds. Kyron
Huigens, for example, argues that "we impose criminal liability in the
absence of a consciousness of harm in at least two other kinds of
cases" and in both of those instances "our intuition is that punishment
is well deserved." Alternatively, he argues that "[t]he conception of
fault or culpability upon which" the condemnation of the negligence
standard "is premised is fundamentally misconceived."7 9
B. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
In addition to recklessness in the criminal law, the "natural and
probable consequences" doctrine is another place where individuals
are held accountable for actions they have supposedly anticipated. The
natural and probable consequences doctrine usually links the
culpability of an accomplice to not only the crime the defendant
intended to assist, but also to the "foreseeable" consequences of this
target offense.80 For example, the California Supreme Court provided
these elements:
77 MAss. MODELJURY INSTR. - CRIM. 6.260 (2018) (emphasis added) (Wantonly or
Recklessly Permitting Another to Commit an Assault and Battery on a Child Under 14
Causing Substantial Bodily Injury).
78 Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 632, 641-43 (1963); see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 123 (2d
ed. 1961). See generally John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal
Law Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111 (1996); George P. Fletcher, The Theory of
Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1971).
79 Huigens, supra note 68, at 432; see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst when
Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 961 (2003) ("Reliance upon a purely objective,
unindividualized negligence standard is justified in much the same way as the result
in Dudley & Stephens: it is necessary to maintain a clear standard of conduct. Holmes,
for example, concludes that the reason for adopting it is the criminal law's 'immediate
object and task to establish a general standard . .. of conduct for the community, in
the interest of the safety of all."').
80 See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 97-98 (1985)
("Secondary parties, as at common law, are also guilty of unintended crimes
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[Tihe trier of fact must find that the defendant, acting with (1)
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2)
the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating the commission of a predicate or target offense; (3)
by act or advice aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated the
commission of the target crime . . . (4) the defendant's
confederate committed an offense other than the target crime;
and (5) the offense committed by the confederate was a
natural and probable consequence of the target crime that the
defendant aided and abetted.81
Under the above definition, assume Defendant A intends to commit
a robbery. If Defendant B knows that Defendant A intends the
unlawful act,8 2 intends to help commit the robbery, does something to
help with the robbery, and Defendant A kills, rapes or intentionally
destroy property of a victim, Defendant B will be held for the murder,
rape or intentional destruction of property if it is determined to be a
"natural and probable consequence" of the robbery (which the courts
usually will), even if Defendant B knows nothing of these crimes and
does not intend to help assist in these crimes.83
The precise description of the mens rea required for culpability
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine varies; it is,
committed by the primary party if those crimes are a natural and probable
consequence of the intended offense. As a matter of theory, secondary parties are
usually said to be accountable for the acts of the primary actor. Their liability is
derivative of the latter's conduct .... ); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless
Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 375-76 (1997) (using "common
purpose" doctrine and noting that American jurisdictions may allow conviction where
the risk is foreseeable, while English courts require actual foresight of the risk); cf.
Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of
Subordinates - the Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues in United
States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 288 (1997) (describing a case in which the court
applied the natural and probable consequences doctrine to uphold that the defendant
was "guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of
any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids and abets").
81 People v. Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Cal. 1996) (requiring the jury to be
instructed on the target offense as part of the natural and probable consequences jury
instructions); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (2018) (defining "principals").
82 The California definition does not make clear whether the knowledge of the
defendant must be of the co-defendant's intent to commit the specific predicate
offense, or a more general unlawfulness. PENAL § 31.
83 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 453-54 (8th ed. 2018) ("The
natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine has been subjected to substantial
justifiable criticism.... Thus, the effect of the rule is to permit conviction of an
accomplice whose culpability as to the non-target offense is less than is required to
prove the guilt of the primary party.").
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nonetheless, the most permissive form of accomplice liability.84 Under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the accomplice's
mens rea can be rendered irrelevant, as long as the accomplice
somehow assists or encourages the principal's conduct.85
Critiques or attempts to constrain the natural and probable
consequences doctrine are many.86 For example, Joshua Dressler
criticizes that liability can be premised on negligence, even when the
underlying offense requires a greater mens rea.87 Michael G. Heyman
asserts that the doctrine eliminates the intent requirement, and
perhaps a mens rea requirement, "dispenses with the requirement of
any personal act of any kind," and lacks a causation requirement.88
These critics have called for the elimination or at least modification of
the doctrine. Sanford Kadish, for example, suggests modification to a
doctrine of "reckless complicity," where the accomplice can only be
84 See John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in
American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237, 239 (2008) ("Due to the inconsistency
between the plain language of states' accomplice liability legislation and its respective
interpretation in the state courts, many states' accomplice laws present a confused
picture in terms of the law's stance on accomplice liability. No aspect of this law is
more complex than that relating to the mental state requirement for accomplice
liability.").
85 Id. at 240 (citing People v. Feagans, 480 N.E.2d 153, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985));
see also id. at 312 (stating that approximately twenty states hold accomplices liable for
crimes that were "natural and foreseeable" or "natural and probable" consequences of
the initial crime).
86 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(b) at 312 & n.42 (AM. LAw INST.,
Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (rejecting natural and probable
consequences doctrine); Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes:
Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1379 (1998)
("Since the natural and probable consequence doctrine flouts the most fundamental
tenet of criminal law that punishment be based on blameworthiness, courts should be
especially mindful of it when assessing accomplice liability for unintentional
crimes."); see also Evan Goldstick, Note, Accidental Vitiation: The Natural and Probable
Consequence of Rosemond v. United States on the Natural and Probable Consequence
Doctrine, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1293-94 (2016) (noting that several state supreme
courts, including Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Nevada, have rejected the doctrine,
and collecting cases).
87 See DRESSLER, supra note 83, at 453-54; see also Kadish, supra note 80, at 375
(describing the two problems with the doctrine as (1) the risk required only needs to
be foreseeable for the accomplice, which is a negligence standard; and (2) the doctrine
allows the accomplice to be convicted even without the mens rea required for the
offense of conviction of the principal).
88 Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case
Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEYJ. CRIM. L. 388, 400 (2010); see also Michael
G. Heyman, Losing All Sense ofJust Proportion: The Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability,
87 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 129, 142 (2013).
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held accountable if he is, at least, reckless with respect to the risk and
where the principal's offense is one of recklessness, not a greater mens
rea.89
Some jurisdictions have, in fact, eliminated or limited the doctrine.90
Whatever our (significant) unease with the doctrine, however, it has
persisted in at least some jurisdictions.91
IV. RECKLESS JUVENILES
In this Part, I put together the pieces from above. What should we
conclude from looking at the development literature that youth cannot
be expected, especially in conditions of stress and/or with peers, to
perceive, assess and decide in the face of risk in the same way that the
law considers culpable for recklessness offenses? 92 Some have
suggested that youth be considered for mens rea generally 93 or that, at
least in juvenile court, we should adopt a "reasonable youth" standard
in examining mens rea. 94 Another choice could be a more subjective
standard for all defendants. I will examine the trends in recklessness
law of criminal damage in the United Kingdom, which has shifted
from an objective to a more subjective standard, as a comparative
89 See Kadish, supra note 80, at 378-79.
90 Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 190-91 (2007) ("[Flew jurisdictions
have expressly rejected the 'natural and probable consequences' doctrine."); see also
State v. Carrasco, 946 P.2d 1075, 1079 (N.M. 1997) (declining to apply the natural
and probable consequences doctrine and requiring that the defendant intend the acts
of the principle); Goldstick, supra note 86 (citing Commonwealth v. Richards, 293
N.E.2d 854, 859 (Mass. 1973); State v. Carrasco, 946 P.2d 1075 (N.M. 1997); and
Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868, 872 (Nev. 2002)).
91 See, e.g., Carter v. State, 933 A.2d 774, 777 (Del. 2007); People v. Robinson,
715 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. 2006); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1192 (Pa.
2013); State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tenn. 2000); Commonwealth v. Herring,
288 Va. 59, 75 (Va. 2014).
92 Scholars have drawn a number of implications for legal doctrine from the shifts
in current understanding of adolescent development. See, e.g., David R. Katner,
Eliminating the Competency Presumption in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, 24 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 403, 404, 419 (2015) (proposing, alternatively a presumption that
children fourteen and under are not competent to proceed in delinquency proceedings
given developmental immaturity and the high rates of mental illness among the
juvenile justice population, or a reworking of the standards for competency of
juveniles); Scott Lenahan, Note, A New Era in Juvenile Justice: Expanding the Scope of
Juvenile Protections through Neuropsychology, 20 SUFFOLKJ. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 92, 93
(2015).
93 See Carroll, supra note 3, at 590.
94 Northrop & Rozan, supra note 3, at 113.
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example.95 I suggest that a rethinking of the doctrines that expressly
account for the actor's subjective beliefs, and in a way that
incorporates our understanding of what youth as a group can be
expected to foresee, is the best step. Concurrent with a shift to
rejecting or disfavoring youth culpability for these offenses is a
retention (at least for now) of the doctrines that impose criminal
liability based on what a "reasonable person" should have done.
Limiting the scope of the argument to crimes of actual foresight would
permit youth to be held to this largely unattainable "reasonable adult"
standard of what they should have done or known. I conclude that for
young people, either in the juvenile or adult criminal system, we
should consider barring liability based on a reckless mens rea and on
natural and probable consequences or, at a minimum, presume that
young people cannot commit these offenses.
This Part also considers whether an understanding of youth
development should matter for imposition of criminal liability.
Perhaps we are willing to hold youth accountable for these offenses
even if we can be fairly confident that we are convicting them of
offenses for which they do not have culpability.96 To examine this
question, this section considers other normative reasons that society
may be willing to impose liability even for individuals who do not
perceive the circumstances as an "ordinary" person would.
A. Considering a Subjective Test of Recklessness
Note that, until now, the Article has discussed youth as a group, as
the research referenced goes to what we know about adolescence
generally, not to what can be said about any particular young
defendant.9 7 In thinking about possible solutions, there is a tension -
95 See Regina v. Caldwell [1982] AC 341 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (adopting
objective standard for reckless mens rea and giving rise to "Caldwell recklessness");
Regina v. G. and R. [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(adopting a subjective standard of recklessness, which applies to all defendants, in a
case involving an eleven and a twelve year old); see also infra notes 99-105 and
accompanying text.
96 On the other hand, many would suggest that criminal liability not extend (or
rarely extend) to those who do not choose to do wrong. See Kenneth W. Simons,
Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
179, 188 (2003) ("[T]he MPC's decision to make recklessness the default mental state
is important as a matter of principle. For it expresses the classic liberal idea that moral
culpability is, and criminal liability should be, based on a conscious choice to do
wrong.").
97 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to
Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 454
1688 [Vol. 52:1665
Reckless juveniles
explored at length in the law and neuroscience literature - between
the group insight obtained through research and the focus on a
particular individual's acts or capacity in the law, especially in the
criminal law.98
One response, which keeps with criminal law's focus on individual
culpability, would be to allow recklessness to be much more
subjective, so that the factfinder could account, in a less constrained
way, for an individual's actual lack of foresight. To consider this
possibility in a concrete way, I briefly review recklessness required for
criminal damage in the United Kingdom, which has moved in a few
notable cases from an objective to a subjective standard. In R. v.
Caldwell,99 the House of Lords, Lord Diplock, rejected Caldwell's
assertion that his voluntary intoxication affected his mens rea, and
defined recklessness to include situations in which the defendant "had
not given any thought to the possibility of there being" an obvious
risk. 00 This definition was applied, sometimes uncomfortably, until
Regina v. G and R.1 0 In that case, an eleven and a twelve year old were
camping without permission, set fire to some newspapers, threw the
papers into a bin and left. The fire spread, causing significant damage,
(2014) [hereinafter Group to Individual]; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., G21 KNOWLEDGE
BRIEF: A KNOWLEDGE BRIEF OF THE MAcARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 2-4 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2881618.
98 See, e.g., Faigman, Monahan & Slobogin, Group to Individual, supra note 97, at
419-20; Carl E. Fisher, David L. Faigman & Paul S. Appelbaum, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining the Challenges of Reasoning from Group
Data in Psychiatry to Individual Decisions in the Law, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685, 687-88
(2015); Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 533, 543
(2016).
99 Caldwell, [1982] AC at 341.
100 Id. at 354 (" [Al person charged with an offence ... is 'reckless as to whether ...
property would be destroyed or damaged' if (1) he does an act which in fact creates an
obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and (2) when he does that act
he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or
has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do
it."). For cases involving youth applying - and pushing at - this standard prior to
Regina v. G. and R., see, e.g., Elliott v. C. (1983) 1 WLR 939 (DC) (fourteen year old
who set fire to a shed because she "felt like it"); R. v. Rogers (1984) 79 Cr. App. R.
334 (trial court rejected an instruction sought by the young defendant that would
account for his age and other characteristics that affected his appreciation of the
risks); R. v. Coles (1995) 1 Cr. App. R. 157 (fifteen year old provided expert
testimony that did have capacity to foresee the risks; convicted under reasonable adult
standard).
101 R. v. G. and R. [2003] UKHL 50, [32], [2004] 1 AC 1034 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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and the youth were charged with reckless damage. 102 The court
questioned whether a defendant can be convicted under the act "on
the basis that he was reckless . . . when he gave no thought to the risk
but, by reasons of his age and/or personal characteristics the risk
would not have been obvious to him, even if he had thought about
it?"103 The trial court had instructed the jury under Caldwell,
including that the "ordinary, reasonable" person was an adult. In
deciding, the House of Lords rejected the alternative of creating a
youth-only Caldwell rule that compared the defendant to a "normal
reasonable child[] of the same age." 04 Instead, they adopted a
subjective standard for all individuals, where the individual must be
aware of the risk and, "it is, in the circumstances known to him,
unreasonable to take the risk." 0 5
B. Reckless Youth
This Article posits instead that youth facing criminal charges, either
in the juvenile or adult criminal courts, cannot be regularly held for
offenses that require a reckless mens rea or that impose the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
As stated earlier, the distinct feature of these two doctrines is the
assignment of culpability to a defendant who, though perhaps not
intending a particular result, "saw it coming"; the defendant is deemed
to have assessed a risky situation, anticipated the real and possible
outcome, and acted anyway in the face of this understanding. 106 What
we have learned from the adolescent development literature and, as
the Supreme Court notes, from common experience about teens,107 is
that youth do not conform to these doctrinal assumptions.1o8 Young
102 Id. at [2].
103 Id. at [1] (Lord Bingham citing the point of law certified by the Court of
Appeals).
104 Id. at [37].
105 Id. at [41] (stating that "[a] person acts recklessly . . . with respect to (i) a
circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he
is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances know to him,
unreasonable to take the risk").
106 See supra notes 61-71, 80-85 and accompanying text.
107 Scott, supra note 2, at 72.
10 The consideration of youth, while not common in the criminal law literature, is
not unheard of; the Restatement of Torts explicitly contemplates that youth will be
relevant to a determination of culpability. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 cmt. b (AM. LAw INST. 2010) (stating Ltat "[a]ll American
jurisdictions accept the idea that a person's childhood is a relevant circumstance"
where liability turns on what an objectively reasonable person would do in the
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people do not experience risk in the same way as mature adults do.
Young people are risk-seekers, and yet they lack the maturity to think
through the very real possible consequences of their risk-taking and to
reflect on and refrain from the risky behavior.109 Stated in the
strongest way, they cannot conform to the criminal law expectations
regarding anticipation of the consequences of their risky behavior,
which is central to culpability in cases involving a reckless mens rea or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
This is a more modest step than a completely subjective test, in that
it is limited to the class of defendant for which there has been
particular discomfort in applying recklessness and avoids the thorny
questions around what other characteristics of a person can be
considered. On the other hand, the rule suggested goes farther, in that
it presumes incapacity for intent - or at the extreme, bans culpability
- for a class of defendants.
Note that the import of the argument does not extend to offenses
that require proof that the youth intended or otherwise acted
"willfully" or even "knowingly." These offenses require a showing that
leads the factfinder to conclude that the young defendant sought out,
appreciated, or desired the result of his actions. 110 Offenses that
require proof of this "higher" mens rea,111 focus the factfinder on the
precisely relevant question - what did this individual child "know"?112
I can anticipate an argument that proving intentionality is likewise
flawed - even if not equally so - in light of our current
understanding of adolescent development. Doesn't the judge or jury
infer intentionality or knowledge from the surrounding facts and
circumstances? And don't we worry that the (adult) factfinders make
assumptions about what young people "intended" or "knew" based on
circumstantial evidence, which leads them to attribute mens rea to the
young defendant that he or she did not actually have? I cannot deny
this possibility. Further, young people absolutely may intend to do
acts that an adult would have the maturity to choose not to do. The
adolescent development literature certainly leads to the conclusion
that this is the case.
circumstances).
109 See, e.g., supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
110 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(b) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985).
-' See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) cmt. 7 at 247 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
112 Carroll, supra note 3, at 556-57.
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Yet, the adolescent development literature has the most to say in the
substantive criminal law on the question of reckless behavior on the
part of young people. 113 Further, there is a practical aspect to thinking
about the elimination of culpability for recklessness, but not for
intentional offenses. Criminal law carries a strong consensus that
intended acts should be punished. 114 Given this normative framework,
for crimes of intent or knowledge, the question to ask seems to be the
quantum of punishment, instead of whether or not criminal
opprobrium should be imposed at all.
C. Doctrinal Dive
In this section, I press on the doctrinal pieces of recklessness to see
if we can think more carefully about what is different about youth who
are defendants in criminal cases. There are three key elements of
recklessness, two of which overlap with negligence. These are: (1)
whether the actor "knew" of the risk; (2) whether the risk taken was
"substantial and unjustifiable" and (3) what is relevant to
consideration of the "actor's situation" when a youth is the actor. 15 I
posit that while the law might, at some future point, be willing to
subjectivize the inquiry about "substantial and unjustifiable" risk, or
be willing to think more elastically about the "actor's situation," the
doctrinal point at which our current understanding of youth is most
relevant is the question of an actor's knowledge of the risk.
First, focusing on a key distinction between recklessness and
negligence, our current legal and scientific understanding of youth
behavior gives us any insight into determining whether youth, as a
group, acted in the face of known risk. To start, the neuropsychological
literature suggests that youth have the cognitive capacity to "know," in
that, in certain environments, they can learn complicated
information.116 That kind of higher-level academic capacity - such as
the ability to do complex math - is not, however, the relevant gauge
for criminal liability. Instead, we must also look to literature on the
113 See supra Part III.A.
114 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 959, 970-71 (2000); see also Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into
The Nature of Criminal Culpability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 503-04 (1998).
115 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985) (defining "recklessly").
116 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 47, at 115-16 ("Developmental psychologists
distinguish between youths' cognitive abilities and their judgment and self-control.
Although mid-adolescents' cognitive abilities are comparable with adults, their
judgment and impulse control does not emerge for several more years.").
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influence of socio-emotional factors, influence of peers, and ability to
assess situations under pressure, as these are more relevant to criminal
situations that call for a recklessness analysis. When these are
examined, we see that young people have a different relationship to
risk than adults. They seek out risk and see risky activities as positive.
They take more risks when in the presence of their peers than they
would if they were alone.117 When faced with a situation in which risk
must be gauged, their assessment is different from the assessment of
an adult.118 We can draw a potential legal conclusion that we should
not hold youth accountable for knowledge of risk in criminal
situations, even if it is fair to infer that adults have that knowledge at
the time.
Second, take a deeper dive at the question of a "substantial and
unjustifiable" risk.11 9 Here, the idea that can be developed from the
adolescent psychology literature is that youth can perceive that "a"
risk exists, but either they do not perceive it with the "correct" (adult)
proportion, or they fail to see it as a risk that is not justifiable to take.
Our intuitions about youth behavior, reflected in the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinions and, to some extent, supported by the literature,
suggest that youth take unjustifiable risks, even when they see those
risks.120 And, the literature on youth sensation-seeking could suggest
that it is biologically normal for youth to take risks that certainly an
117 Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra note 55, at 56 ("[I]t is reasonable to
speculate that the social and arousal processes that may undermine logical decision
making during adolescence, when connectivity is still maturing, do not have the same
impact during adulthood.").
118 See Kathryn Monahan, Laurence Steinberg & Alex R. Piquero, Juvenile Justice
Policy and Practice: A Developmental Perspective, 44 CRIME & JUST. 577, 578 (2015)
("Since the mid to late 1990s, scientific research has provided consistent evidence that
adolescents are developmentally different from adults in ways that have implications
for the treatment of young people in the justice system."); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 812-16 (2003); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective On Serious Juvenile
Crime: When Should Juveniles Be Treated as Adults?, 63 FED. PROB. 52, 55-56 (1999).
119 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3 at 237 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985) ("The risk of which the actor is aware must of course be
substantial in order for the recklessness judgment to be made. The risk must also be
unjustifiable.... There is no way to state this value judgment that does not beg the
question in the last analysis; the point is that the jury must evaluate the actor's
conduct and determine whether it should be condemned. The Code proposes,
therefore, that this difficulty be accepted frankly, and that the jury be asked to
measure the substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk by asking whether its
disregard, given the actor's perceptions, involved a gross-deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor's situation would observe.").
120 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
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adult would view as unjustifiable and the literature explains this with
the "developmental mismatch." 121 Kenneth Simons posits that even
under the current MPC definition of recklessness, one reading is that
individuals who see a risk, but do not perceive the severity of it, will
not be deemed reckless.1 22 Simons cites the case of In re William G.,
which is a perfect example.1 23 In that case, the court found insufficient
evidence of recklessness - judged "by the standard of fifteen year olds
of like age, intelligence and experience" - when faced with a fifteen
year old doing tricks on shopping carts in a parking lot with two
friends, who careened the cart into a car and was charged with
reckless criminal damage. 124
A number of scholars such as Peter Westen, however, would assert
that the concepts of substantial and unjustifiable risk are normative
ones - "they are ones that are entirely a function of which risks the
people of the state regard as acceptable and unacceptable - not a
function of contrary or dissenting perceptions, emotions, or
judgments by individual actors."1 25 Youth do not perceive the risks
that they are taking as substantial and unjustifiably ones. Something
that is risky behavior - from an adult's perspective - is a
biologically-based and developmentally "normal" characteristic of
youth.
The third doctrinal point worth examining is whether our legal and
scientific understanding of youth gives any insight into what should
be considered in evaluating the "actor's situation."1 26 The MPC
commentary allows that this language is what permits a more
individualized approach to a defendant's blameworthiness.1 27 The
121 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
122 Simons, supra note 96, at 191 (" [T] here is an important third possible category
- namely, where an actor realizes that he is creating some risk, but concludes (either
reasonably or unreasonably) that the risk is tiny and insubstantial. (Imagine a
speeding driver supremely confident that he has the skill to avoid a collision.) Should
such an actor really be treated as merely negligent, not reckless? Especially if he was
unreasonable in inferring that the risk was insubstantial? Courts in MPC jurisdictions
appear to have reached different conclusions.").
123 Id. (citing In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)).
124 In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
125 Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 137, 145 (2008).
126 See generally Simons, supra note 96, at 185-86 (noting that the Code "fudges"
with this phrase and encouraging guidance on how subjectivized the inquiry should be).
127 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3 at 237 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985); see also iW. at 238 ("Ultimately, then, the jury is asked to
perform two distinct functions. First, it is to examine the risk and the factors that are
relevant to how substantial it was and to the justifications for taking it. In each
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MPC Commentary, cases and scholarship are, understandably,
reluctant to allow the "situation" of the actor to individualize the
inquiry based on the idiosyncratic or anti-social perspective of the
defendant. The MPC commentary explicitly recognizes the "inevitable
ambiguity" created. 128 On one hand, this possibility of subjectivization
could be seen as a promising location to consider the age of a
defendant; and, in a given case with an individual defendant, that
might be true. On the other hand, shoehorning the general group
characteristics of young people into one of the few doctrinal areas that
accounts for individualization may be misguided if the goal is to
account for how youth, as a group, might be accounted for by the law.
D. Should We Hold Youth Culpable for Reckless Offenses even if We Are
Convicting Them for Offenses for Which They Do Not Actually Have the
Legal Mens Rea?
This Article focuses on criminal offenses that hold the defendant
accountable for risks that she supposedly actually was aware of, and
perceived as unjustifiable, and asserts that youth cannot and should
not be held accountable for these offenses.
Even if youth cannot actually appreciate the relevant risks in the
way that the law of recklessness provides, we should consider whether
the law might nevertheless want to impose this unobtainable standard.
This section considers the possibility that even if youth do not (or
often do not) perceive, assess and act in the face of "known" risk in
the way that recklessness requires, that we should hold them
accountable for these offenses because of what they, if they were
adults, should perceive. I examine briefly three of the common reasons
- the harm caused by their actions, society's desire to incentivize
them to take care, and the value of objective, easier-to-apply
standards. I conclude that none of these overcomes the need, under
recklessness, to have defendants who can actually meet the stated
standard.
instance, the question is asked from the point of view of the actor's perceptions, i.e., to
what extent he was aware of risk, of factors relating to its substantiality and of factors
relating to its unjustifiability."); Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the
Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1435, 1444 &
n.74 (2010) (noting, in discussing the GoetZ case, that "the court's observation that an
actor's 'situation' includes the physical attributes of the victims and defendant" was
"non-controversial," as it "largely tracks the law elsewhere").
128 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 at 242 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
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1. Harm caused.
One commonly asserted reason to hold individuals accountable for
harm that they did not foresee, or that they did not contemplate, is
simply the consequences of their acts.129 The real harm caused -
whether anticipated or not - is of such significance that society is
willing to impose a criminal punishment.130 This is, for example, one
justification offered for holding individuals responsible for the natural
and probable consequences of their actions.131
2. Care taking.
An additional reason that society holds people accountable for
reckless and negligence offenses is simply to induce or require care
taking, and punish those who are unwilling, or unable, to take
sufficient care.1 32 Even if we know that in some cases, the person
might actually only be grossly negligent, we may be willing to convict
and punish them for a reckless offense because we want to induce care
taking.1 33
129 Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983)
("Why should wrongdoers be punished? Most people might respond simply that they
deserve it or that they should suffer in return for the harm they have done. Such
feelings are deeply ingrained. . . ."); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment,
and the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY LJ. 501, 520-21 (2012) ("A moral
theorist, instead, might suggest that because the actor had the initial choice to engage
in behavior that led to the wrongful act, he must be held responsible for his actions.").
130 See Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 4-5 (2010); see also Russell P. Hanser, Punishing Hate, Punishing Harm, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1047, 1052 (2000).
131 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
597, 600-01 (2001) ("Moreover, the flip side also presents a problem. That is, the law,
in its current state, presents the danger that opaquely reckless people are being treated
as purely reckless, and hence, our criminal justice system may be treating them as
more culpable than they actually are. For example, South Dakota's Supreme Court
suggested that merely being aware of the dangerous nature of one's conduct will
suffice for manslaughter; the defendant need not foresee death as a result. But doesn't
it matter why the opaquely reckless actor thinks his conduct is dangerous? What if he
never foresees the prospect that someone might die? Should the disregard of
'dangerousness' suffice for responsibility for manslaughter?" (citing State v. Olsen, 462
N.W.2d 474 (S.D. 1990))); Claire Finkelstein, Responsibility for Unintended
Consequences, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 579, 579-81 (2005) (arguing against imposing
negligence criminal liability for effects that individual perpetrator did not foresee or
deemed highly unlikely to occur in order to align with responsibility judgments in
ordinary morality).
132 Finkelstein, supra note 131, at 580.
133 This argument can be made for corporate actors who put risky products into
the stream of commerce.
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3. Upholding value of objective standard and greater ease of
application1 34
Third, even if we recognize that some individuals - either as a
group or because of their idiosyncrasies - cannot meet the required
mens rea standard, the law might be willing to enforce the law anyway
to have a consistent standard that applies across all cases. Another
reason would be to avoid the difficulty of determining who actually
cannot meet the legal standard from those who would assert their
inability to do so for the sake of avoiding liability.
These are not insignificant reasons to be cautious about eliminating
the culpability of youth for reckless offenses. In the end, these are
overcome, however, by the capacity (and actual practice) of the law to
continue to punish for harm caused and encourage care taking
through the codification of other offenses, especially offenses
involving negligence and strict liability. Other offenses, which are not
tied to the subjective understanding of a young person, can and do
address these goals of criminal law. There is, additionally, benefit -
and moral authority - to laws that mean what they say. If the law of
recklessness purports to hold offenders accountable for their actual,
individual foresight, then the force of the law is enhanced by taking
that language seriously.
CONCLUSION
The ban or presumption against finding youth culpable for reckless
offenses could work in a number of ways.
One possibility would be to ban charges involving recklessness for
potential defendants under a certain age in both juvenile and adult
criminal court.1 35 If the defendant is a youth under eighteen or twenty-
134 Perhaps a variant on the goal of implementing objective, widely applicable
standards is a skeptical of claims that "didn't foresee risk" or "didn't know" or a
concern that the cost of determining whether the person actually had the required
mens rea is prohibitively high.
135 That age could reflect the literature's understanding of development; meaning
that it would extent to perhaps twenty-one years old or even up to twenty-five years
old. If a rule is established at, for example, the age of twenty-one, we can wonder what
difference there is between a defendant who is twenty and eleven months, who would
receive the benefit of the rule, and a defendant who is twenty-one and one month,
who would be assessed under standard rules of liability. In the area of youth, the U.S.
Supreme Court has drawn a line in the Eighth Amendment at the age of eighteen,
although many have critiqued this line and it has shifted over time. Compare Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (allowing the death penalty for offenders at or above
sixteen years old), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring the death
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one or twenty-five, the youth recklessness doctrine would bar
accountability for offenses that sound in recklessness or natural and
probable consequences. These youth could be charged with and
convicted of, when it exists, similar offenses that sound in negligence,
because we could make a decision that, even if youth do not actually
meet the mens rea requirement, that we want to hold them to an adult
standard of what they "should have" done. The strength of a ban can
be seen from the perspective of the categorical remedy taken by the
Court in Graham.136 In Graham, the Court acknowledged that it was
hypothetically possible for a youth to be one of the few who showed
developmental maturity and whose crime would merit life without
parole, but that the questionable ability to make this determination
demanded a ban nonetheless. 37
Another, more permissive, way to map the law and research on
youth onto recklessness doctrine is through burden shifting and a
series of jury instructions. Young people who are facing offenses that
involve reckless mens rea or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine would be presumed, as a class, to not be culpable of these
offenses and would get a jury instruction to that effect. The
government would have to prove the traditional elements of the
offense, and would have to overcome, by a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, the presumption that the young person was not able to
anticipate risk. Youth under eighteen, twenty-one, or twenty-five
charged with offenses that have a reckless mens rea requirement or
youth that are being charged with the "natural and probable
consequences" of an act would also receive specialized jury
instruction. These instructions should do at least three things: First,
an instruction should make clear -' contrary to recklessness
instructions in some states - that a reckless offense requires actual
foresight and appreciation of the risk, under the circumstances of the
case. While I believe that this legal distinction is a good one - and
keeping the distinction between recklessness and negligence would be
salutary for adult and child defendants as a demarcation of culpability
- the distinction, I argue, certainly matters for children and young
adults. Second, instructions for these young defendants should
expressly subjectivize and force the fact-finder to consider the
pressure of circumstances, foresight, and ability to resist impulsive
risk-taking from the perspective of a teenager. Third, the fact-finder
penalty for offenders under eighteen).
136 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77-78 (2010).
137 Id.
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should be given succinct and accurate information about the ability of
youth to perceive, think through and resist risky behavior, especially
under conditions of stress or the influence of others, so that youth are
held accountable for behavior that is developmentally attainable for
them.
Implementation of these potential changes would not be flawless,
but could be accomplished. And, consistent with our recklessness
doctrine, we would move toward holding criminally liable of crimes of
foresight individuals who actually can and do foresee the risks of their
activities.
